Again we should perhaps not be surprised that political activists pay little attention that their positive analysis is completely at odds with that of those on the opposite end of the political spectrum. When we turn to the academic literature, however, the state of analysis is not all that much better. Many (indeed I suspect most) treatments of the political economy of the IFIs in the academic literature view them through one or at most two lenses, and in the latter case it is often only to contrast the author's correct lens with a conventional wisdom based on some false lens.
In part this may reflect professional incentives. In both of the (partially overlapping) fields of public choice and of international political economy (IPE), the road to quick recognition and advancement has been dominated by papers that advance innovative explanations that are contrasted favorably with some alternative. This is certainly legitimate science, but we have reached the point when the generation of interesting hypothesis has greatly exceeded our knowledge about their empirical relevance.
Of course collectively a good deal of empirical evidence -both quantitative and qualitative -has been presented. Public choice research has established beyond a doubt that rent seeking in the public arena is important, but this is not the same as showing that it is everything. In the early stages of the development of a theory or approach, it is quite appropriate to accept the standard showing that predictions of the analysis are consistent with important observations. Only if the approach passes such plausibility probes should it begin to be taken seriously for real world applications.
Public choice analysis has passed this stage with flying colors. Too often, however, at least in applications in the areas of macro and international economic policies and monetary and financial institutions, public choice analysts have been content to remain at this stage. Over time, however, such plausibility of probes should give way to critical experiments in which the criteria shifts from consistency of the theory with the data to the ability to explain or predict better than other theories or approaches. In this regard it is not sufficient to contrast specific public choice or IPE theories only with public interest alternatives. We have many specific theories within public choiceinformed and uninformed median voter models, bureaucratic politics, etc -and we have massive amounts of empirical support for the propositions that all of these theories have some relevance and that none have complete explanatory power. This suggests that in most applications our focus should be on the comparative explanatory power of a number of factors, rather than assuming the power of one particular public choice or IPE theory.
Furthermore, sometimes different hypotheses will be compliments rather than substitutes.
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In the more mature stages that public choice and IPE research are now entering, more attention needs to be focused on developing and testing contingent analysis that pushes our theoretical analysis deeper. Such analysis should focus on the conditions most likely to affect the comparative explanatory power of primary factors or hypotheses across different issue areas, institutional arrangements, and specifics of economic and political conditions. 2 One purpose of this paper is to give an illustration of this type of analysis by considering the bureaucratic incentives for budget maximization across different types of institutional structures, specifically contrasting the IMF and the World Bank, organizations that are often lumped together in critiques of the IFIs.
A second purpose is to focus on some methodological issues concerning the standards of evidence for testing public choice and IPE hypotheses. These will be illustrated with respect to recent analysis of the IFIs by Roland Vaubel (1986 Vaubel ( ), (1991 and (1996) . These examples were not selected because Vaubel's analysis was particularly weak. To the contrary, in terms of the quality of scholarly contributions to positive political economy analysis of the IFIs, Vaubel's pioneering applications of public choice analysis must be give very high marks. In his original contribution to public choice analysis of international organizations in general, Vaubel (1986) 1 I have argued in Willett (1989) that this is often the case in trade policy, where both strong lobbying positions and at least superficially plausible appeals to public interest arguments appear to be helpful in securing protection. 2 See Dillon, Odell, and Willett (1991 Public choice analysis provides a powerful search light for illuminating important aspects of the behavior governments and bureaucratic organizations, but we must not let this power blind us to the need to carefully investigate the particulars of each application.
For example, despite the tendency of critics from both the left and the right to lump them together, the IMF and the World Bank are in many important respects quite different types of organizations. Both the objectives of the staff and the monitoring capacity of top management and outside groups vary considerably across these institutions.
In the early stages of public choice analysis, there was a quite understandable tendency for bureaucratic theory to replace the profit maximization assumption of the neoclassical theory of the firm with a budget maximization assumption for the objective of bureaucrats. For managers in large private organizations, personal income, perks, power, prestige, and advancement are all likely to be frequently highly correlated with the size of budgets, personnel or sales and the budget maximization hypothesis has been shown to have considerable explanatory power in many contexts. This is the approach taken by Vaubel in his analysis of the IFIs. He argues that "bureaucracies are interested in power, prestige, and amenities. To achieve these objectives they try to maximize their budget, their staff, and their independence" (1996, p. 195) . Bruno Frey (1997) has recently argued, however, that "the public choice literature is rather mute on the question of how employees in an international organization use the leeway awarded them" (p.
120). He goes on to suggest that "international bureaucrats pursue those policies that
give them most prestige and influence within the reference groups with which they are connected" (p. 121).
There will be conflicts among at least some of the goals of maximizing budget, output, salary, and prestige. Miguè and Bèlanger (1974) , for example, suggest that bureaus are likely to trade off a smaller total budget against a greater discretionary budget. As Ronald Wintrobe [1997] puts it in his recent review of modern bureaucratic theory, "What do bureaucrats want? Economists being who they are, the most common answer to this question has simply been 'Mo' money (a bigger budget). However, as a general answer this appealing but simple idea has been largely discredited and more sophisticated answers have been developed (bigger discretionary budget, influence on public policy, power, or simply utility)."
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In the following analysis I will suggest that in some types of organizations Frey's emphasis on prestige will generate greater incentives for bureaucrats to pursue Vaubel's assumption of budget maximization than in others and that in this regard, Vaubel's analysis will be a good deal more applicable for the World Bank than for the IMF. In earlier work, Banaian et al (1998) , Willett (1990) , I argued that in the case of independent central banks, budget manipulation is likely to be a much less powerful motivation than for the typical government organization. Power, prestige, and perks, yes -but these objectives are likely to require only a tiny fraction of the revenues generated as a byproduct of normal monetary operations. Thus, while many governments face strong incentives to be concerned with the seigniorage raising effects of national monetary policies, central banks themselves typically will not. The expenditures that directly affect the attraction of the job for central bankers will often be infra marginal with respect to total seigniorage revenues, i.e., they will be independent of changes in total revenues.
That is definitely the case with respect to the Federal Reserve Board in the United States where often more than ninety percent of seignorage revenues are turned over to the federal government and there is no fixed ratio of funds kept by the Fed.
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In analyzing national and international monetary organizations, we need to carefully evaluate both the degree of discretion that bureaucrats have and the objectives which they seek to pursue with this autonomy. As is emphasized in the growing literature on the political economy of central bank independence, the amount of effective autonomy enjoyed by national monetary officials varies tremendously across countries and time -depending both on formal institutional arrangements and a host of other factors.
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In general we would expect international bureaucracies to have greater autonomy than national ones (see Frey [1997] and Vaubel [1986] ), but this is also likely to vary considerably from one organization to another.
I will argue that as a consequence of micro incentive structures, national monetary authorities should have much less interest in budget maximization than World Bank 5 See Banaian et al (1988) . 6 For recent discussions and references to the literature see Banaian et al (1995) and Cukierman (1992 Similarly, by the nature of their primary outputs, we would expect finance ministries to display less budget maximization behavior than commerce departments -again with the crucial caveat that there may be important variations over the different functions performed by each ministry.
The number and visibility of individual outputs affects both the incentives of bureaucrats and the ability of top management or other overseers to monitor their behavior. The difficulty of measuring the quality of output is also important. Where this is high, there will be a greater tendency to monitor on the basis of more easily measured inputs. The prevalence of many hard to measure outputs is particularly fertile ground for the relevance of the budget maximization hypothesis.
In this regard, there is a clear progression as we go from national monetary policy makers to the IMF to the World Bank. While national central banks have responsibility for making monetary policy for one country, the IMF has responsibilities for making recommendations about macroeconomic policies for many countries, as well as dealing with more specific policy issues involved with the operation of the international monetary system. While the specific responsibilities differ, the environment of the IMF is much like that of national central banks and finance ministries. As such, there would seem to be relatively little incentive for key decision makers at the IMF to maximize staff size.
Having a well paid, high quality staff is another matter.
Where the IMF differs most importantly from national central banks is that a major part of its output is not just policy advice and international monetary agreements, but also loans to individual countries for balance of payments assistance and crisis One particular difficulty in this type of 'testing' is that the interpretations will often be heavily dependent about views of correct economic theory. Indeed frequently evaluations will be of necessity tests of joint hypothesis about behavioral objectives and views of how the world operates (i.e. positive theory). Often, however, those who use this approach slide over this problem, making implicit assumptions about correct positive theory. Thus, for example, to critics from the far left who adopt Marxist or structuralist economic theory, the recessions that so often accompany the initiation of IMF programs are seen as clear evidence of the IMF's capture by capitalist interest. However to most mainstream economists, this evidence would be perfectly consistent with a public interest interpretation, the recessions being a necessary short run price that must be paid in order to achieve long run economic stability.
Vaubel criticizes the IMF for designing economic policy programs based heavily on discretionary fine-tuning as opposed to strict adherence to rules and quite correctly argues that this is consistent with the Fund's bureaucratic interests. This is a strong test, however, only if rules are clearly superior to discreation on public interest grounds.
While Vaubel adheres to a school of macroeconomic thought which believes this to be the case, this is a subject of considerable controversy among macroeconomists. Thus
Vaubel's observations of a preference for discretionary policy are equally consistent with bureaucratic self-interest and public interest behavior based on beliefs that the situation is too complex to handle via rules. 
IV. Loan Pushing and the Effectiveness of IMF Programs
Another example of bureaucratic behavior given by Vaubel is the traditional low interest rates on IMF loans. This is consistent with bureaucratic incentives for loan pushing, it could also reflect public interest motivation of the IMF's stock holders to provide aid to developing countries which represent most borrowings from the IMF.
(That this probably would not be a first best form of aid is a different issue).
Charges that bureaucratic incentives to keep the loan funds flowing have resulted in insufficient stringency in the IMF's policing of its policy conditionality are also difficult to evaluate. Incentives for such behavior certainly exist and a number of writers from the right have viewed it as almost self evident that IMF funding has overwhelmingly tended to retard rather than promote adjustment. 9 Writers on the left tend to believe just the opposite, however. They charge the IMF with promoting poverty through excessively harsh adjustment programs. Krueger (1997, p. 36) notes, "judging whether policy reform was pushed 'hard enough' is problematic."
9 See, for example, the contributions in Badow and Vasquez (1994) and McQuillan and Montgomery (1999) . 10 As Krueger (1997, p. 17) notes, "most critiques of the Fund centered on its conditionality…as being too harsh." 11 For recent contributions and references to the literature, see Bird (1996) , Killick (1995) , Killick et al (1998), Ul Haque and Kahn (2000) .
The studies also show that contrary to the strongest forms of bureaucratic capture allegations, 12 the IMF has been willing to pull the plug on a substantial number of programs. Thus despite the bureaucratic incentives to push loans, there must also be some strong countervailing incentives. Important here are the personal incentives of top IMF officials to be concerned with the IMF's reputation. This reflects not only the officials' concerns with their own reputation, but also the emphasis placed by the Fund and its share holders on its catalytic role as a signaler for private capital flows. This provides the Fund with incentives to worry about reputation. Furthermore, as Bird
[1998] emphasizes, within a principal agent framework the Fund has incentives to use conditionality to signal to its shareholders that it is being a good agent.
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There is reason to question whether such incentives have been sufficient to keep the credibility of IMF programs from declining over time. 14 For example, many of the programs pulled by the Fund are started again soon after with little apparent penalty.
Whatever its' bureaucratic incentives for loan pushing, the Fund's share holders have managed to exercise sufficient control to sharply limit the aggregate growth in the IMF's lending capacity. Fischer [1999] points out that as a proportion of world GDP Fund quotas have fallen by over ninety percent. Economies of scale in the demand for international reserves and the virtual cessation of borrowing from the IMF by the industrial countries would tend to reduce the size of the need for increases in IMF quotas, but the rapid growth of international capital mobility would cut in the opposite direction.
No such adjustments, however, would change the qualitative conclusion that growth of 12 See, for example, Sadler et al (1995) . 13 For an alternative principal-agent analysis where the IMF is treated as the principal and borrowing governments as the agents, see Killick (1996) . 14 See, for example, Bird and Rowlands (1997) and Willett (2000a) .
IMF quotas and hence the IMF's lending potential has been far less than the growth of the world economy.
Further evidence on the limited success of loan pushing comes from judgements that many countries tend to come to the Fund too late rather than too early. 15 This suggests through revealed preferences that the policy conditionality of Fund programs was considered to have enough bite that these costs to national sovereignty and decision making freedom were perceived to be more than sufficient to offset the subsidized rate of interest on IMF loans.
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There is, however, evidence consistent with gaming on the part of the IMF that does not appear to be consistent with public interest interpretations. Vaubel [1991 Vaubel [ , 1996 finds evidence of hurry up lending in advance of reviews of quota increases. This is consistent with the old bureaucratic maxim that failure to spend all of the old budget makes it more difficult to get increases in the new budget. It is hard to think of a public interest interpretation that would fit this pattern. 17 However, once we recognize that there may be more than one set of considerations at work, we should pay attention to the size as well as the existence of evidence supporting the operation of bureaucratic or other biases. I have no quarrel whatsoever with Vaubel's evidence that there is an element of hurry up lending in the behavior of the IMF. What I find most interesting, however, is that Vaubel's numbers suggest that the magnitude of this effect is rather modest.
Vaubel's table shows that the average increases in the third and fourth years of the quota cycle are only 4.2 percent and 3.6 percent respectively. These increases are indeed greater than the average increase in the first two years (which is slightly negative), but the amount of increase seems rather small. Although Vaubel does not present tests of statistical significance, I would not be surprised if these differences were significant at conventional levels. I would interpret Vaubel's results, however, as suggesting that hurry up lending at the IMF appears to be a minor rather than a major problem.
V. Staff Size and Salaries
Whether we can say that the IMF staff is not just well paid, but also overpaid is not as easy as it might first appear. As Vaubel (1991) It should be added that while Fund staff do received many non-pecuniary benefits, most are worked quite hard. Indeed, concern with excessive workloads was expressed by the team of outside experts that recently reviewed the Fund's research activities (IMF 1999b) . While critics often refer to foreign travel by the Fund's staff as an additional benefit, many at the Fund wish that they could get away with going on fewer foreign missions. Traditionally the U.S. government, in part responding to Congressional concern, has tried to hold down the size of pay increases at the IFIs, but with only modest success. All in all, it is probably fair to conclude that the IMF management and staff have been pretty successful in looking out for their own narrow pecuniary interests, but not by so much as to make the supply of applicants for Fund jobs virtually perfectly elastic as Vaubel (1996) suggests. 18 In terms of overall policy implementation, it should also be remembered that salaries are a relatively small part of the IMF's total budget.
The prediction made in Section II that the World Bank will have more bureaucratic flab than the IMF fits well with the qualitative judgements of close observers of the two institutions. For example, the Bretton Woods Commission [1994] , a set of blue ribbon leaders from the academic, policy, and financial communities, depicts a bloated staff at the World Bank in contrast with a lean high quality staff at the IMF.
19 Vaubel (1996) finds that the size of the staff has grown more rapidly at the World Bank than at the IMF (6.8 percent per annum versus 4.3 percent over the period of 1955 to 1994). IMF staff growth, however, was higher than for the BIS (2.2 percent) and the OECD (2.1 percent). It is not clear a priori, however, whether any of these growth rates are too high or too low relative to the tasks that the organizations are being asked to perform.
Some argue that the IMF lost its purpose after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods adjustable-peg exchange rate regime in the early 1970s and should have been abolished. Hence its growth rate should be strongly negative. Such arguments are based, however, on a lack of appreciation of the full range of roles that the IMF was designed to play. The IMF certainly has been keen to throw itself into new tasks such as dealing with the international debt crisis and the economic transitions of the former communist countries, 20 just as any bureaucracy theorist would expect. And in each case some critics have argued that the IMF had no business taking on these new tasks. Unfortunately from the standpoint of clear-cut testing, there are also many experts who argue that it was in the public interest for the IMF to take on these tasks.
While I have no doubts that threats to survival of the institution would provoke as strong a bureaucratic response at the IMF as at any other institution, there is also clear evidence that the IMF's moves into new areas also reflected pulls from its major shareholders. Thus it would be no easy task to sort out the relevant magnitudes of agent push and principals pull in these episodes. Likewise one can plausibly argue that the complexity of today's international financial issues are much greater than they were during the Bretton Woods era. Thus a plausible case could be made that if anything, the IMF is under rather than overstaffed.
21
Recognition of the differences in the nature of the types of loans they provide is important for attempts to produce quantitative measures of productivity at the IMF and World Bank. Vaubel [1996] presents measures of productivity at these organizations based on the number of credits approved per year divided by the number of staff. While 20 See, for example, Henning (1996) and James (1996) . 21 For arguments that the IMF needs to expand its staff capabilities in the area of political economy analysis, see Willett (2000b Vaubel (1991 Vaubel ( , 1996 also presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the size of the IMF's staff is unresponsive to need, thus suggesting a great deal of bureaucratic autonomy. It is extremely difficult, however, to construct a good empirical proxy for the demand or need for IMF services. As a consequence, it is not surprising that Vaubel does not find significant coefficients on his need proxy. This result is equally consistent with the bureaucratic autonomy hypothesis and with the poor proxy hypothesis. While the R 2 's of the equation are extremely high, this appears to be due primarily to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Thus, the power of the test to discriminate among hypotheses is quite low. It is a quite legitimate exercise for a plausibility probe, but not for a critical experiment. In the mature stage of public choice analysis, all tests should include discussion of their power -not just in the formal statistical sense -but in terms of their likely ability to discriminate among alternative relevant hypothesis.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Roland Vaubel has performed a valuable service in highlighting the role that bureaucratic incentives can play in influencing the behavior of the IFIs. This is a healthy antedote to both the traditional public interest treatments of international organization by many economists and some international relations scholars and the dominant realist view in international relations that views international organizations as having little autonomy and influence.
We need to push beyond Vaubel's analysis, however, to incorporate a broader range of considerations. I have suggested that the bureaucratic incentives for loan pushing and maximizing staff size are likely to be considerably less at the IMF than at the World Bank. This supports Bruno Frey's (1997) suggestion that we need to pay greater attention to the study of the objectives of international organizations.
We also need to pay more attention to the relative importance of various external influences. It is not difficult to establish that major financial institutions have more influence on IMF both directly and indirectly through the intermediation of national governments than does say the agricultural lobby or the typical voter. 22 We also have many examples, however, where the IMF fails in its role as lackey to big finance. The recent emphasis by the Fund on the need for greater private sector burden sharing during international debt crisis is an important case in point. Thus developing even a rough idea of how much the Fund has catered to financial special interests will not be an easy task. 22 For recent quantitative studies of the influence of financial interests and US political interests on IMF policy, see Gould (2000) , Stone (2000) , and Thacker (1999) .
But it is important. The same will hold for the influence of US foreign policy concerns.
There is strong evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, that the US often has a strong influence on IMF policy, but the US does not always get its way. There is a lot of important political economy research to be done.
Moving to a higher level of public choice analysis is likely to stimulate some cognitive dissonance. Easy answers and comforting certainties will be found far less frequently. Much of our analysis will have to become more nuanced and tentative. We would have to face more explicitly the vast amount that we do not know and accept a much wider range of grey areas in which the available evidence is not conclusive. We will likewise have to invest more time in learning the particulars of a situation before we can offer analysis with confidence. We cannot safely assume that a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy and that all political and economic systems operate in the same way. Abandoning plausibility probe stage for the richer world of contingent analysis and critical experiments will not be entirely comfortable, but the power of public choice analysis deserves no less.
